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Effective performance management is key to 
improving the practices and outcomes of European 
PES. This paper aims to extend existing research 
undertaken through the PES to PES Dialogue and 
PES Mutual Learning programmes in three dimen-
sions. First, it presents findings on recent reforms 
and lessons regarding performance management 
(PM) based on the PES Benchlearning initiative. Sec-
ond, it discusses accountability within PM systems 
and highlights some of the relevant reforms in PES 
across Europe. Third, it describes PM systems of PES 
that have not been covered in detail by the earlier 
studies.
The findings of this report are based on desktop 
research (covering the theoretical background as 
well as current PM practices), information collected 
in the PES Network Benchlearning process, com-
bined with written consultation and in some cases, 
interviews with PES experts in the case study 
countries. 
The PES to PES Dialogue programme has already 
produced a number of documents on performance 
management in PES in order to support the devel-
opment of PES practices in this area. The first ana-
lytical paper on the topic reviewed the research 
evidence on performance management in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) PES and discussed practical impli-
cations for policy makers and PES managers 
(European Commission [EC], 2012).  The second 
analytical paper focused on Management by Objec-
tives (MbO) techniques and provided a detailed por-
trayal of such methods in three highly developed 
PES (EC, 2016a). The comparative papers and the-
matic reviews summarise current PES practices and 
highlight good practices based on surveys and net-
work events (EC, 2013a, c, d). Two recent toolkits 
provide step-by-step guidance for PES on how to 
develop and maintain effective strategic perfor-
mance management. The EC (2013b) covers four 
main elements of performance management from 
developing objectives to placing incentive systems 
in operation. The most recent toolkit provides guid-
ance and tools for PES to refine or establish key 
components of performance management systems 
(EC, 2016b).
The report is structured as follows. The next section 
briefly reviews the recent literature with a specific 
focus on accountability, and describes findings from 
the analysis of data collected in the PES Benchle-
arning process. The second section outlines reflec-
tions on recent changes in PES practice based on 
five case studies. The last section includes case 
studies of France, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and 
Sweden. Annexes provide more information about 
the data collection process for the report.
INTRODUCTION
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1. OVERVIEW OF 
THEMES IN 
THE RECENT 
SCIENTIFIC AND 
EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
LITERATURE 
ON PES 
PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT
1.1 Introduction
There is a strong body of research evidence drawn 
both from the scientific literature and from commis-
sioned research focussed on EU PES themselves, that 
PES can learn from in relation to performance man-
agement, improvement and accountability.  Indeed, 
this evidence has led to the introduction of Benchle-
arning across EU PES.  The PES Network conducted 
this in order to improve the efficiency of the PES and 
their provision of services. Benchlearning creates a 
systematic connection between performance com-
parisons and measures of mutual learning have been 
initiated at the European level.
In this section of the report we briefly summarise the 
recent scientific and applied research evidence on 
PES performance management and then provide an 
overview of initial outcomes from the PES Benchle-
arning process.  The key insights from this discussion 
are that there is potential for PES to use learning from 
these different sources to continue to adapt and 
improve their practice.  The evidence presented below 
also suggests that the Benchlearning and mutual 
support process for PES might continue to develop to 
incorporate learning from the process.  This is central 
to ensuring that performance management contin-
ues to support performance improvement, that PES 
remain vigilant for, and act to mitigate, unintended 
consequences and that the ways that performance 
management is applied are sympathetic to the spe-
cific culture and ethos of public service.
1.2 Theoretical background
1.2.1 Recent PES to PES Dialogue literature 
emphasise Performance Management 
for learning, ownership, and reflection on 
service improvement
Recent reports from the PES to PES Dialogue 
programme summarise the state of knowledge 
in relation to performance management in PES. 
A cluster of reports (European Commission, 2012, 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c) suggested that while there 
was evidence that PES performance management 
can support performance improvement, the evi-
dence base needed to be strengthened. These 
reports argued that theoretically PES performance 
could be improved by combining PES performance 
management with ‘inclusive governance’ (as a 
means of achieving ‘inclusive growth’) and that 
cyclical processes of evaluation and organisational 
learning could assist in this process.  These reports 
argued in favour of using a systemic approach to 
performance management based upon a frame-
work for understanding how inputs linked through 
processes to outputs and on to intermediate and 
final outcomes.  Based on the approach of theory-
based evaluation, learning was to be achieved by 
constantly revisiting expectations about the rela-
tionships between these different stages to ensure 
that expected outcomes materialise.  Performance 
data can be used to underpin and inform this pro-
cess of continuous learning and improvement. 
These reports also argued that analysis of perfor-
mance variation and benchmarking could assist in 
this process of learning from experience.  Crucially, 
these reports argued that using performance data 
and learning processes to achieve consensus and 
dialogue were central to successful performance 
management. An EC update published in 2016 
continued to stress these aspects of performance 
management and reviewed more recent empirical 
evidence of the ways in which they were operat-
ing in selected PES. The report drew important 
insights from this evidence; stressing the role of 
ownership, simplicity, fairness and communication 
as core to successful practice. It concluded that if 
performance data is to be used to facilitate innova-
tion and learning, then tolerance and reflection on 
failure is central to the process of improvement.
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1.2.2 Recent scientific literature continues to 
debate the contribution of Performance 
Management to performance improvement
Recent additions to the scientific literature on per-
formance management in relation to PES continue 
to debate long-running themes such as whether 
performance management can be shown to have 
any positive impact on actual performance; 
whether impacts on performance are actually the 
result of other factors such as workload and 
resource constraints; and the effects of perfor-
mance management on realising unintended con-
sequences.  For example, Hvidman and Andersen 
(2014) test recent theoretical arguments in the 
performance management literature and find that 
performance management can have different 
results in the public and private sectors.  With data 
based on school performance in Denmark, they 
find that while there is a greater emphasis on per-
formance management in the public sector this is 
less effective at securing performance improve-
ment than in the private sector, possibly because 
performance data itself – rather than improve-
ments in outcomes – achieves a symbolic impor-
tance.  By contrast, several other US-based studies 
in different sectors (Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 
2013; Sun & Van Ryzin, 2014) do find evidence of 
performance improvement resulting from perfor-
mance management practices.
1.2.3 Performance Management, workloads and 
remaking policy at the frontline of service 
delivery
In relation to performance management; workloads 
and resources; and the politicised nature of front-
line service delivery work (i.e. frontline remaking of 
policy through management, for e.g. see Brodkin, 
2013), Van Berkel and Knies (2016) find that per-
formance management is less influential on the 
performance of frontline welfare staff in the Neth-
erlands than is caseload size. They also find that 
the combination of performance measures and high 
workloads may be mitigated by frontline workers’ 
prioritisation of smaller group of jobseekers within 
their caseload. That however, is consistent with a 
third ongoing discussion of the relationship between 
performance management and unintended conse-
quences.  Prioritisation of jobseekers at the front-
line level is consistent with ‘creaming and parking’, 
to the detriment of the ‘hardest to help’ jobseekers. 
Similarly, Rees et al. (2014) argue that external per-
formance management with strong incentives and 
penalties (such as in payment for results contract-
ing) result in widespread unintended consequences 
such as ‘creaming and parking’; which, they find, is 
commonplace in the UK Work Programme. Doring 
et al. (2015) argue that such data shows that 
research needs to focus on the ways that public 
managers, external agencies, and other actors con-
struct the role and meaning of performance man-
agement through negotiation and conflict. 
Performance management often enables public 
managers to construct indicators of their own per-
formance, legitimating their roles and status. On the 
other hand, Wegrich (2015) argues that the intro-
duction of performance management in local job-
centres in Germany has had the unintended positive 
effect of helping to coordinate multi-level 
governance.
1.2.4 Performance Management and incentives
The discussion above on the role of professional 
construction of roles and ‘performance’ through per-
formance management systems raises an impor-
tant issue that is also picked up in the Benchlearning 
assessment criteria. This relates to the role of incen-
tives related to performance measures.  This is an 
aspect of performance management that has been 
under-explored so far in the PES to PES Dialogue/
PES Mutual Learning process. Though it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive 
overview, there is a deep scientific literature on the 
issue of ‘Public Service Motivation’, whether this is 
different in the public sector and more ‘pro-social’ 
than in the private sector and how it is affected by 
performance management (Moynihan, 2010; Moyni-
han, Vandenabeele, & Blom-Hansen, 2013). This lit-
erature suggests that care is needed to ensure that 
the values and motivations of staff are accounted 
for in recruitment, selection and employee alloca-
tion to tasks, but also that performance manage-
ment techniques do not ‘crowd out’ pro-social 
motivations among different staff groups (Heinrich 
& Marschke, 2010; Moynihan, 2010).  This suggests 
that further research might be valuable in order to 
explore the relationship between motivation, per-
formance management and incentives especially if 
these are to be promoted by the Benchlearning 
criteria.
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1.3 Insights from the PES 
Benchlearning reports
1.3.1 The Benchlearning Documentation
The newly established Benchlearning process imple-
ments many aspects of the systemic approach to 
using performance management for mutual learn-
ing and exchange of practice and reflection that 
recent literature on PES performance management 
has advocated (see Section 1.2.1 above).  The doc-
umentation produced in this process includes a 
series of assessment reports based on each PES 
(the culmination of a structured self-assessment 
and visit from external peer reviewers) and a sepa-
rate series of ‘Change Reports’. The latter show how 
each PES has taken ownership of the change pro-
cess and responded to suggested changes in the 
assessments. A review of this documentation can 
provide substantial evidence of current practice and 
change in PES.
1.3.2 Wave 1 of the Benchlearning process 
shows PES continue to have varying 
sophistication in their approach to 
Performance Management
The first round of PES site visits (in 2015 and 
2016) found that performance management (PM) 
was unevenly developed across European PES. 
According to their overall scores for this enabler, 
9 PES are at the basic ('developable') stage, 11 PES 
are at a 'developing' stage and 9 PES have achieved 
the 'well-developed' or 'mature' status. 
The enablers defined in the PES Benchlearning pro-
gramme cover the following four elements of stra-
tegic performance management:
A.1 Establishing the fundamentals of performance 
management by target-setting 
A.2 Translation of targets into (key) performance 
indicators and measurement 
A.3 Following up performance measurement 
A.4 Making use of the results of performance 
management  
The above four elements of PM are closely con-
nected: target setting (A.1) and indicators (A.2) cre-
ate the basis for follow-up (A.3) and further 
development (A.4). The enabler that scored the 
least across PES is A.4 (how PES make use of the 
results of PM): most PES do less well in the A.4 
element compared to their scores in A.1-A.3 (see 
Figure 1 below). Further analysis might explore 
whether this is a product of the assessment pro-
cess itself or PES practice.
In 'developable' PM systems, while there may be 
objectives, these are often not specific to the PES 
and not translated into measurable operational 
targets. The adjustment of targets to regional 
needs may also be lacking. Indicators typically 
describe PES processes but do not reflect perfor-
mance, or no targets are set for the local level. In 
most cases, there is no performance dialogue, no 
benchmarking and no or weak incentives to moti-
vate staff performance. The added value of the 
PES is not communicated to the public, nor to 
stakeholders.
Figure 1. Combined scores on the sub-dimensions of performance management in the PES Benchlearning enablers
Source: European Commission, Results of qualitative benchmarking, PES Benchlearning programme. 2016
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In 'developing' PM systems, target setting is well 
established, but performance is often only moni-
tored, not actively managed, i.e. no target expec-
tations are formulated and results are not linked 
to operational activity. Other common shortcom-
ings are that there might be too many targets, tar-
gets are not result-oriented or not adjusted to 
regional / local needs. Indicators may not suffi-
ciently focus on outcomes and efficiency. Bottom-
up performance dialogues may be lacking (or only 
used at the national level) or not sufficiently 
focused on performance. Some benchmarking 
exists, but may be not sufficiently controlled for 
local context. There may be some financial incen-
tives to motivate staff, but these are weak and/or 
not closely linked to operational results.
In 'well-developed' but not fully mature systems, 
there may be some room for improvement. For 
example, in involving social partners in the target 
setting process, or extending performance dia-
logues to quality issues.
1.3.3 The Benchlearning process suggests that 
formalised performance management 
practices such as target setting are only 
the first step
The quantitative analysis of the Benchlearning (BL) 
indicators of how performance management is 
linked to overall effectiveness has produced some 
interesting insights (Fertig, 2017). Effectiveness 
was defined as context-adjusted average perfor-
mance on a number of outcome indicators in the 
period of 2010-15 and 2014-15. The regressions 
to identify the relationship between enablers and 
performance outcomes were done by using the 
context-adjusted performance groups as the 
dependent variable. First, it appears that target 
setting and the translation of targets into indica-
tors are a necessary first step, but on their own 
have a limited impact on PES performance (ICON/
EC, 2016). High scores on targeting (A.1) and indi-
cators (A.2) seemed to contribute to increasing 
exits to unsubsidised jobs, but had no effect on 
fast placement, or on the placement of low skilled 
jobseekers or youths. Follow-up (A.3) has some 
more pronounced impact on PES outcomes, and 
what really matters is that the results of PM are 
systematically used.
1.3.4 Institutional context shapes approaches to 
accountability
The institutional context of the PES influences the 
PM system and within that, the structures and 
instruments that ensure the accountability of PES 
managers. In this section we highlight three 
aspects of the institutional context that may be 
especially influential. 
First, the design and implementation of PES PM 
systems is likely to be constrained by the general 
efficiency of public administration, which varies 
considerably across EU Member States (MS).2  Such 
constraints may occur in several aspects of the 
institutional setup, for example the resources and 
capacity, overall transparency of governance struc-
tures, the prestige of a job in the civil service, the 
rules that govern the remuneration and employ-
ment of civil servants, or operational autonomy. 
Though this connection is certainly not determin-
istic, the PES PM system is likely to be weaker in 
countries where the overall efficiency and/or 
capacity of public administration is weak.3 
Second, the institutional framework defines the 
principal forms of accountability: in centralised 
systems, where the PES is subordinated to the line 
ministry (as in most MS), the main form is bureau-
cratic, while in decentralised systems there may 
be some role for political accountability, involving 
regional or local governments and the local elec-
torate (e.g. in DK, NL or PL) (Manoudi, et al., 2014). 
If the PES is an autonomous public body (as in AT, 
DE, EL, FI, FR, SE), accountability is based on con-
tractual obligations.4 
A third and closely related aspect concerns the 
actors involved in the chain of accountability. 
These are defined by the structure of the welfare 
system, as well as political institutions and tradi-
tions, which, though not deterministic, tend to have 
a strong influence on the structure of relations 
between government bodies and stakeholders. For 
example, in Corporatist welfare regimes, social 
2 See for example Worldwide Governance Indicators  
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home) scores.
3 A rough indication of this relationship is that PES scores 
of the EU Benchlearning on Performance Management 
are significantly correlated with indicators of government 
effectiveness (using the WGI scores mentioned above).
4 However, the PES itself may include other stakeholders 
and/or involve other actors in setting contractual 
obligations. For example, the Portuguese PES is 
subordinated to the Ministry of Labour, but also has  
a Tripartite Board involving social partners.
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partners often have a supervisory role over the 
PES, and in some countries they may even have 
the power to appoint and dismiss the head of PES. 
By contrast, in liberal welfare regimes, typically it 
is solely the line ministry that governs the PES, with 
limited involvement of social partners, and often 
relies on private providers and market competition 
as a performance incentive.
1.4 Summary and conclusions
In sum, these insights from the recent scientific lit-
erature on Performance Management suggest that 
there is scope for PES to continue to learn and adapt 
their practice based on evidence. This is true not just 
of individual PES but also of the Benchlearning 
assessment process, where criteria for judging PES 
should continue to evolve in line with the scientific 
evidence. In particular, the literature suggests an 
ongoing need to demonstrate that performance 
management is effective in supporting PES to 
improve performance. It also suggests that perfor-
mance management is not a replacement for 
resources and that ongoing attempts are necessary 
to manage and mitigate the acknowledged unin-
tended consequences of performance management, 
such as creaming and parking. Finally, there is a need 
to ensure that linkages between performance man-
agement and HR systems and incentives/sanctions 
are sympathetic to the specific ways in which moti-
vations operate in public services like PES. 
2. REFLECTIONS 
ON RECENT 
CHANGES IN 
PES PRACTICE: 
CHALLENGES 
FOR PES
2.1 Introduction
The discussion in this section is based on the case 
study data reported in Section 3 and the overview of 
the Benchlearning process presented in Section 1. 
It outlines areas of PES practice and change where 
further consideration might be given, based on 
prior data in EU PES to PES Dialogue and Mutual 
Learning programme reports, and more recent 
scientific literature. It also reflects on current reform 
plans and the first wave of the Benchlearning pro-
cess to outline ways in which PES reforms might 
suggest evolutions in the way that Benchlearning 
operates.
2.2 Recent changes in practice
The current change reports (as at July 2017) have 
identified some new initiatives aimed at improv-
ing performance management, some of which 
appear to be inspired by the recommendations of 
the first site visit. These are presented below in 
alphabetical order: 
 ● The French PES reform affected mainly the 
target setting system. The aim of the reform 
was to negotiate performance targets from 
the national, regional and local level and to 
achieve a comparative performance process 
by identifying clusters across different types 
of employment zones as well as good practices 
and sharing them at local level. Other areas of 
development related to devolution and 
dialogues around performance data.
12
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 ● In Ireland there is a tight focus on 
implementation of a shift in emphasis in 
relation to active services as the economy 
recovers.  In this sense, performance 
management is focussing on the 
implementation of reform and improvement 
activities.
 ● The recent reforms in Lithuania affected all 
four dimensions of performance management. 
The PES introduced a Quality Management 
System (QMS), and switched to a more 
process-oriented management with mission, 
vision, objectives and key values redefined.  
It also reorganised the allocation of PES 
resources so that the planning and distribution 
of the budget is now based on the PM system 
and corresponding indicators. Lastly, it 
developed a new strategy for human resource 
management, which among others would 
include a training system and new staff 
motivation measures.
 ● In Portugal, the first reform aimed at providing 
management support information in a swifter 
and easier form to all management levels in 
order to rapidly detect potential deviations in 
due time which will enable their correction, 
and improving availability and use of labour 
market information at all operating levels.  
The second reform is developing a system of 
non-financial incentives aimed at promoting 
individual expectations and local units. Both 
initiatives correspond to recommendations of 
the first PES site visit. 
 ● In Sweden, the recent reforms focused on 
self-assessment tools to strengthen quality 
assurance, the development of a demand side 
indicator and the strengthening of staff 
incentives.
 
2.3 Possible drivers of PM reforms
The impetus for PM reforms may come from many 
different sources. There may be an external policy 
challenge, such as the sudden rise in unemploy-
ment, which pushes the PES to improve the effec-
tiveness of its HR resources, as in the case of the 
recent PT initiative. PM reforms may be triggered 
by broader government initiatives concerning, for 
example, the promotion of New Public Manage-
ment, regional autonomy or digitisation of public 
services. Reviews and policy advice by international 
organisations such as the OECD or the EU PES Net-
work can also facilitate change, as was the case 
in LT, where ideas were generated both by internal 
reviews and visits to mutual learning events and 
developed into a roadmap by external assessors 
of the PES Benchlearning initiative. Lastly, reforms 
may be driven by the motivation of PES managers 
and also by the internal learning processes of the 
PES organisation. This latter source is obviously 
more influential in organisations where internal 
monitoring and feedback mechanisms are strong.
2.4 Continuous reforms to PES 
Performance Management
The data reported in the case studies below in rela-
tion to the individual PES in our sample suggest 
that PES continue to engage in restless innovation 
in their approach to performance management. 
Not one of the case study PES were ‘standing still’ 
in their approach.  Partly this reflected reforms to 
meet changing labour market circumstances.  For 
Ireland and Portugal in particular, improved labour 
market conditions were leading to changing per-
formance management; moving away from crisis 
considerations associated with high unemploy-
ment to focussing on reintegrating harder-to-help 
groups. In Sweden, high numbers of refugee 
inflows were also impacting on PES performance 
measures as a result of changing policy priorities. 
However, it was also clear that reforms to PES per-
formance management reflected an ongoing 
search for continuous improvement, learning from 
experience and attempts to overcome internal 
These recent changes in practice suggest that 
many PES are making efforts to ensure future 
reforms extend beyond system design and to 
using performance management data to 
focus on (continuous) service improvement,  
in line with the emergent findings from  
Wave 1 of the Benchlearning process  
(see Section 1.2.3).
There are many sources of motivation for PES 
reform to focus on continuous improvement, 
many of which relate to domestic conditions. 
However, the Benchlearning process can aug-
ment these, and provide an impetus for continu-
ous improvement and reflection on practice, 
even where other motivations are absent.
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challenges.  Some of these challenges–for instance 
in the case of Lithuania–reflected fiscal constraints 
and the need to utilise performance management 
to enhance efficiency.  
2.5 Benchlearning supports  
pre-existing PES Reforms
All PES in our sample reported that they were 
adapting their approach, introducing reforms and 
considering new developments as a response to 
the Benchlearning process.  However, this was not 
always directly in response to recommendations. 
For example, several PES (e.g. FR, SE) suggested 
that Benchlearning recommendations reflected 
existing thinking and plans in the PES, and, as such, 
reform plans were already in place to address the 
recommendations. In some other cases, the level 
of detail provided in the recommendations and 
change reports made it difficult to assess the 
extent to which reform plans actually addressed 
the recommendations made.  
2.6 Developments related to 
accountability
Few of the recent reforms in the five countries that 
this paper focuses on have addressed accounta-
bility. One exception is the Lithuania plan to intro-
duce a system that allows planning and distributing 
budgets to be based on the PM system and corre-
sponding indicators. This would strengthen 
accountability to the extent that the resources 
match the targets assigned to PES managers. 
Another is the French reform, which is quite exten-
sive. The refined clustering method may produce 
a more accurate measure of the performance of 
PES offices, while devolution will give more auton-
omy to managers in finding the best ways to reach 
performance targets. 
Despite this, there is much evidence that perfor-
mance management in PES is tightly coordinated 
with accountability and the Benchlearning process 
supports this.  It is also important though that PES 
staff are able to innovate to introduce new ser-
vices or approaches designed to improve perfor-
mance or meet changing labour market needs. All 
PES cases were adapting their management 
approach to the conditions of (gradual) recovery 
experienced in their labour markets.
2.7 Further work is needed to 
support and underpin PES work 
on staff incentives
All the PES cases we looked at were developing 
their approach to incentivising staff and the Bench-
learning assessment criteria themselves promote 
this. While it is clear that supporting performance 
management with suitable HR processes is bene-
ficial, the evidence on motivations and pay incen-
tives is less so. As such, the relationship between 
PES staff motivation and the positive and negative 
effects of pay incentives (as well as different 
mechanisms or approaches for distributing them, 
such as individual or collective reward) might be 
an area for further research, in order to ensure that 
the Benchlearning criteria and PES reform efforts 
reflect the key messages from scientific research 
on this issue.
PES will need to ensure that the warnings in 
the scientific literature about the impact of 
resources and caseloads are heeded; while 
performance management can help to ensure 
efficiency, high PES caseloads are a more 
significant effect on PES performance than 
performance management itself.
Recommendations as part of the Benchlearn-
ing process might helpfully support the PES’ 
own improvement process, but future reports 
will need to document sufficient detail in the 
recommendation to ensure that it is possible 
to track recommendations through reforms as 
they are implemented. This will be necessary 
to effectively learn from experience, including 
where reforms do not work as intended by 
the PES and/or reviewers.
It will be important for future Benchlearning 
reviews and PES change reports to emphasise 
accountability arrangements, especially as 
conditions or performance management 
approaches develop, to ensure accountability 
mechanisms remain appropriate. Accountabil-
ity is also essential to learning from practice, 
and as such needs to be central to the Bench-
learning process. At the same time, there is  
a need for balance to ensure that Benchlearn-
ing and/or accountability do not suppress 
innovation and flexibility to meet changing 
labour market conditions
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3. CASE STUDIES
3.1 Introduction
The PES Mutual Learning programme, through its 
Benchlearning activities and as a follow-on to pre-
vious work under the predecessor PES to PES Dia-
logue Programme, has produced over 20 documents 
on performance management in PES and thereby 
supported the development of PES practices in this 
area. The existing studies provide an in-depth 
description and analysis of the performance man-
agement systems operated by the PES in Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Apart from 
describing the general approach to performance 
management, these studies also highlight specific 
good practices, such as the German data warehouse 
(Weishaupt, 2016) or individual performance man-
agement in Switzerland (Adamecz, 2013).
To build on this work (rather than to repeat it) and 
to maximise the added value of this analytical 
paper, five countries were selected for further 
review in a case study format.   
3.2 Rationale for the selection 
process
The criteria applied for this selection process are:
1. The country has scored a 4 or above (out of 
6) on at least two of the sub-indicators in 
Section A (performance management) in the 
PES Benchlearning exercise so that the infor-
mation presented and discussed can be 
regarded as relating to positive practice;
2. The PM system of the country has not been 
described in detail in previous publications 
between 2012-16, so that there is additional-
ity in coverage and learning; and
3. A balance of countries in terms of institu-
tional context (looking at welfare regimes and 
PES governance), so that there is potential for 
all PES to benefit from the discussion.
2.8 Continuous change emphasises 
the need for high-quality and 
ongoing staff training
There are ongoing and significant reforms in all 
the PES cases covered here, in relation to perfor-
mance management and a range of other areas 
of service delivery.  Some of these include the 
spread of approaches – such as performance dia-
logues at different organisational scales – which 
are likely to involve new skills and be challenging 
for staff.  Similarly, several PES cases suggested 
that new technological developments are placing 
new challenges on staff, and the changing nature 
of the labour market will only intensify this.   
2.9 Few PES report the development 
of shared performance 
management to support the 
‘conducting’ role
None of our PES cases were developing ‘shared’ 
approaches to performance management with 
other public sector actors or stakeholders as part 
of their current reform plans.  Shared performance 
management might be crucial to developing the 
‘conducting role’ envisaged for PES as part of the 
PES contribution to Europe 2020.  
Future research as part of the development 
of the Benchlearning process might focus on 
the relationship between motivation, perfor-
mance and different types of incentive.
As PES further embed these existing changes 
and implement new ones to match external 
labour market developments, they will need 
to ensure that their staff are appropriately 
trained to analyse, understand and undertake 
the myriad actions which result from such 
analysis, such as engaging in effective dia-
logues. This will mean that PES staff will 
need ongoing access to high-quality training, 
to support performance management, and 
strategic improvement and adaptation.
Future Benchlearning processes might use-
fully enquire into the scope for shared perfor-
mance management, plans to implement it 
and barriers to this.
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3.4 France: French PES (Pôle Emploi)
3.4.1 Context
Following legal and structural changes in 2009 to 
merge the previous Assedic (in charge of delivering 
unemployment insurance benefit to claimants) 
agency with ANPE, Pôle Emploi (PE) was formed as 
the French PES (European Network of PES, 2015b). 
This merger coincided with the economic crisis of 
2009-10 onwards, meaning that the new organisa-
tion was faced with challenging labour market con-
ditions at the same time as organisational 
destabilisation (Bunel & Tovar, 2015). Unemploy-
ment rose over that period, now standing at slightly 
under 10 %, with the share of long-term unemploy-
ment rising from around 3% of the total in 2009 to 
4.3 % in 2016. Youth unemployment has been a 
particular problem, at more than 25% and still 
standing at nearly 22% (Eurostat). Some analysis 
suggests that post-2009 crisis effects were particu-
larly felt by those with less employment protection, 
despite policy attempts to protect them, such as 
3.3 Case studies selection
The selection of case studies is set out in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Selection of case studies
SELECTION COUNTRY5 WELFARE REGIME AND PES GOVERNANCE
First choice for case 
studies
Ireland6 Liberal, centralised
 Lithuania Liberal, centralised
 Portugal Southern, centralised
 France Corporatist, centralised and devolved
 Sweden Social-democratic, centralised
Second choice 
alternatives
The Netherlands Social-democratic, de-centralised
Slovenia Corporatist, centralised
Spain7 Southern, de-centralised
5 Countries where the change reports mention 
developments in PM systems are marked in red.
6 There is no change report for Ireland yet, but European 
Commission (2016a) mentions some recent 
developments.
7  There is no change report for Spain yet, but European 
Commission (2016a) mentions some recent 
developments.
The five first choice case studies are presented below in alphabetical order. The second choice alterna-
tives were not consulted.
reforms to the duration of unemployment insurance 
(Vlandas, 2016). Recent years have therefore been 
characterised by a mix of challenging external con-
ditions and the need to institute internal reform.
The French PES is an autonomous public institution, 
which sits under the Labour Ministry but also has a 
Managing Board on which a range of government 
ministries and social partners are represented 
(social partners – trade unions and professional 
organisations/employers – will be the majority in 
the Board by 10/19).  Within the PES, decision-mak-
ing is top-down, with regional level managers hav-
ing negotiated autonomy to set their own regional 
strategies, according to the regional labour charac-
teristics, under the supervision of the PE Director. At 
the lower level, county and local level managers 
have little financial and managerial autonomy–5% 
of budget can be used according to local orienta-
tions. Very recent reforms have offered greater free-
doms and incentives to regional managers.
3.4.2 Performance Management Arrangements
The French PES sets three- and then four-year objec-
tives (currently for the period 2015-18) through 
a process of tripartite negotiation and elaboration of 
a Strategic Plan relevant for a medium-term period 
(Pôle Emploi 2015, then Pôle Emploi 2020). The pre-
vious planning period had established a set of objec-
tives to implement a ‘Steering by Results’ system in 
which local agencies would be analysed by clusters, 
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 ● Satisfaction rate of jobseekers in relation 
to monitoring.
 ● Number of jobseekers in intensive support.
 ● Number of first unemployment benefits 
(whether insurance or assistance) payments 
on time.
 ● Financial compliance rate.
 ● Applicant satisfaction rate relating 
to information about allowances.
 ● Share of vacancies involving a specific support 
from French PES which have been filled by 
French PES.
 ● Share of vacancies filled by job seekers 
registered at French PES.
 ● Employer satisfaction with their last 
recruitment.
 ● Employer and jobseeker satisfaction with 
digital services.
 ● Time spent on monitoring and personalised 
support services for jobseekers.
This is a sharp reduction on past performance 
monitoring approaches, which previously relied on 
very large numbers of indicators. These indicators 
are combined in a ‘single dashboard’. A specific 
system of comparative performance has been 
achieved, which enables the comparison of locali-
ties and offices on the basis of similar labour mar-
ket conditions. Regional level managers can now 
set their own targets and receive salary incentives 
based on their performance against these indica-
tors and targets.  
By support through the results-based manage-
ment approach, a process of transparency has 
been built up. A specific external communication 
process is organised every six months on the 
French PES corporate website for the four main 
indicators, visible to the national and local offices 
level.
3.4.3 Accountability
The French PES has a tripartite board involved in 
target setting, which has a strong top down empha-
sis. The board also includes representatives of five 
other ministries and the PES contributes to other 
forums and committees that relate to the labour 
market, such as in relation to vocational training 
and regional employment.  Within this structure, 
the PES has a good amount of operational auton-
omy in relation to its organisational structure, 
staffing allocation, service design and partnership 
development. One of the objectives in the tripar-
tite agreement relates to creating stronger links 
with local communities and ensuring further 
which compared them on the basis of similar labour 
market conditions, with performance dialogue oper-
ating between operational levels. The Strategic Plan 
Pôle Emploi 2020 focusses on PES internal activity 
and support for jobseekers, on the most in need, in 
contrast to many other PES who contract out support 
for these service users. The French PES also focuses 
on improving the organisation’s reputation and con-
fidence with employers so that they can become the 
partner of choice.  A central unit has been established 
to share good practice examples and to improve and 
evaluate pilots for designing services for the PES 
transformation process (Inov’Actions platform).
The Pôle Emploi Strategic Plan 2015-2020 empha-
sises five main priorities for the French PES:
 ● Faster jobseeker registration, using the 
Internet to collect basic information so that 
the first jobseeker interview with the PES can 
focus on a holistic diagnostic and substantive 
needs of support.
 ● Focussing more tightly on jobseekers with the 
most needs (more time, more personalised 
services, and simpler accessibility).
 ● Strengthening relations with employers, 
especially those experiencing recruitment 
difficulties, such as SMEs and those with hard 
to fill vacancies (and by having staff 
dedicated to employers).
 ● Making better use of digital and online 
services for both jobseekers and employers, 
both in terms of aggregating vacancies and 
referrals, but also in aggregating and making 
accessible e-services, and active services 
online such as support search applications or 
training via Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs).
 ● Simplification of requirements on jobseekers 
and employers.
By doing this, the objective is to accelerate job-
seekers’ return to employment and to improve the 
satisfaction of both employers and jobseekers. 
These commitments are turned into 14 perfor-
mance indicators:
 ● Number of returns to employment.
 ● Number of returns to sustainable employment 
(though no specific target).
 ● Number of jobseekers available to work who 
have remained without any contact with work 
in 12 of the last 15 months.
 ● Rate of access to sustainable employment 
six months after exiting training funded 
by French PES.
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devolution, going beyond those currently available 
to regional managers.  Staff provide feedback to 
strategic developments through an annual ‘social 
barometer’.  
Several initiatives are underway that relate to 
accountability. The devolution of greater responsi-
bilities and freedoms to regional managers relate 
to this, as does the development of clustering and 
analysis of performance variation.  Performance 
dialogues (mixing bottom-up and top-down 
approaches) are held to hold managers to account 
for performance against indicators and targets. 
A network of correspondents within the organisa-
tion, with the support of the Management, Perfor-
mance, Work Organisation Division, Statistics and 
Studies Division, Quality Management Division and 
Strategy Division conducts these. A new central 
unit for exploring and sharing lessons and 
good practices across the organisation has been 
established. A new ‘invocation’ process has been 
introduced to enable individual staff to suggest 
good practice and innovations. New innovations 
are piloted and evaluated before being rolled out.
Training courses on results-based management 
and comparative performance are offered at the 
University of Management (for middle managers 
and managers) to ensure the ownership of the 
approach.
3.4.4 Successes and challenges regarding 
performance management
The Benchlearning assessment in 2015 (European 
Network of PES 2015b) suggested that the main 
strengths of the French PES were the ‘solidly uni-
fied organisation, coupled with a high degree of 
innovation, a clear change management approach 
and strategy led strongly by senior management’. 
This led to a ‘well developed’ rating. Evaluation and 
sharing of good practice were also praised, along-
side attempts at multi-channelling through e-ser-
vices.  Performance management was singled out 
as a particular area for praise with the reduction 
of performance indicators and a refocussing on 
results as opposed to resources mentioned explic-
itly. Greater freedom and incentives to regional 
managers were also praised, as were attempts to 
improve the analysis of performance variation 
through clustering.
The Benchlearning report also suggests that the 
unusual strategy of focussing PES resources on 
the hardest to help, while contracting-out stand-
ard employment services, is an area to monitor for 
lessons learnt for other PES in the future. This is 
unusual in that many PES which have contracted 
out services have focussed PES resources on newly 
unemployed jobseekers while contracting-out ser-
vices to the hardest to help. There is some evi-
dence that payment by results systems in that 
context confound the attempt to use new innova-
tive services to help those who need it most. As 
such the French innovation here is interesting and 
may be a source of important learning for other 
PES in the EU and further afield.
In making recommendations for further reform, 
the Benchlearning assessment was cautious in 
suggesting that it is important to consolidate exist-
ing reforms and organisational changes, given the 
rate of external and internal change over recent 
years.  Nevertheless, several areas of potential 
improvement were noted:
 ● Strengthening the “link between anticipated 
labour market developments and the 
definition of objectives”, especially by 
improving linkages between PES data sets 
and other administrative data and research.
 ● Incorporating weightings into target setting 
at regional and local level.
 ● Establishing a link between performance and 
pay for all staff.
 ● Increasing jobseeker profiling, using an holistic 
approach.
 ● Reinforcing the development of post-
recruitment services for some jobseekers 
(linked to the profiling categories).
 ● More detailed information sharing through 
the ‘dashboard’ to the frontline level.
3.4.5 Current Reform Plans
The PES response to the Benchlearning assess-
ment in relation to performance management in 
particular suggests that the French PES is 
prioritising:
 ● Improvement of comparative performance 
analysis through the dashboard.
 ● Publishing the results of performance analysis 
at the local and regional level.
 ● Developing a monthly reporting system and 
making periodic analysis of all indicators and 
performance at each level (national, regional, 
departmental, local); and then focusing on 
corrective action on trends of each of them 
according to targets.
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 ● Developing performance dialogues and 
support for local offices, and within the 
clusters, by networking and focusing on good 
practices at this level.
 ● Increasing devolution and autonomy at the 
local level.
 ● Strengthening the support available for those 
with the most needs, through training 
provision.
 ● Proceeding with a quality management 
system, based on services commitment at 
local level for jobseekers, employers and 
partners.
In particular, the change report notes a project to 
improve clustering and analysis of performance 
variation, as well as promoting managerial dia-
logue at local level. Another project provides 
a clearer picture of employer satisfaction at the 
local level for improving progress, for example by 
allowing local staff to include verbatim comments 
from employers in local surveys. It also suggests 
that improvements are underway to strengthen 
training provision to jobseekers with the most 
needs, especially greater attention to linking these 
to sectoral needs at a local level. In this way, the 
ability to anticipate labour market developments, 
skills and competency needs is taken into account.
3.5 Ireland: Irish PES (Intreo)
3.5.1 Context
Like other PES, employment services in Ireland have 
been characterised by institutional reform to meet 
the challenges of difficult labour market conditions 
over recent years. In the early 2000s Ireland enjoyed 
strong growth, nearly full employment and a low 
unemployment rate. However, after 2007, the 
unemployment rate climbed quickly, with Ireland 
one of the worst affected countries by the crisis. The 
overall unemployment rate reached nearly 15% in 
2011 and 2012, but had fallen to less than 8% in 
2016 and less than 6.5% by mid-2017. During the 
recession, job losses were concentrated in construc-
tion and manufacturing and particularly reduced 
male employment. The share of LTU also rose 
sharply, peaking at 9% in 2012 and is still nearly 
5%, nowhere near the very low pre-crisis levels. 
Youth unemployment though has fallen more 
sharply than for the EU and Euro area as a whole 
and now stands at 12% (Eurostat, 2017).  Unem-
ployment is likely to fall over the next year or so due 
to strong levels of growth (Government of Republic 
of Ireland, 2016).
In Ireland as elsewhere, employment and welfare 
policies have undergone significant reforms, mov-
ing from passive provision of income supports to 
active strategies to facilitate a return to employ-
ment. The underlying logic of such ‘activation’ strat-
egies is that of a ‘social contract’ or ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ framework. This acknowledges the 
‘right’ of individuals faced with certain contingen-
cies (e.g. unemployment) to receive income supports 
from the State, but also stresses individuals’ 
‘responsibility’ to engage with State-provided 
employment and activation services as a condition 
for ongoing receipt of income supports. In Ireland, 
this is seen in the relatively recent integration of 
employment and income support services through 
the ‘one-stop-shop’ model as part of the Pathways 
to Work approach to labour market activation.  
The Pathways to Work (PtW) Strategy sets out 
a comprehensive reform of the State’s approach to 
helping unemployed jobseekers return to work. It 
was initiated in 2012 and is designed to comple-
ment the Action Plan for Jobs strategy as part of 
a twin-pronged approach to tackling the jobs crisis 
that emerged in the final years of the last decade. 
The Action Plan for Jobs is focused on stimulating 
employment growth; Pathways to Work on making 
sure that as many as possible of these new jobs, 
and other vacancies that arise in the economy, are 
filled by people who are unemployed jobseekers. 
The most significant PtW reform was the integra-
tion of entitlement and employment services in the 
one-stop-shop model of the Irish PES, combining 
services formerly provided by FAS and the Commu-
nity Welfare Service with existing (and also 
reformed) DSP services. The PtW strategies 2012 
to 2015 were successful in contributing to a reduc-
tion of circa 38% in the numbers of people unem-
ployed over that period.  
As part of these reforms in 2012, Ireland re-organ-
ised its PES with the rollout of the new programme 
(European Commission, 2015). The Irish PES pro-
vides a ‘one-stop-shop’ for access to employment 
services based on a three-stage model:
 ● Stage one: reception, access to services and 
claims.
 ● Stage two: integrated decision-making, 
welfare payments claim award and profiling, 
agreement of jobseeker commitments and 
appointment for group information session; 
and 
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 ● Stage Three: group information session and 
one-to-one activation services, agreement of 
a ‘progression plan’, and referral to training or 
other support programmes.  Following this, 
service-users are followed-up at different 
intervals, dependent on their profiling group.
The Irish PES is an integral part of the Department 
for Social Protection (DSP) and does not have oper-
ational autonomy. There are 3 regions and 13 divi-
sional areas and the PES employs about 700 staff. 
Local PES offices implement services designed by 
the head office. Trade unions and employers are 
represented in the Labour Market Council who 
advise on the delivery of the Pathways to Work 
Strategy.  Some services are contracted out to 
external providers such as the Local Employment 
Services and through the JobPath programme 
which focusses on the LTU and which offers 
a graduated payment for results system (European 
Network of PES, 2015a). All services are designed 
nationally and the same services are delivered 
throughout the network; there is little scope for 
operational autonomy at the local level.
3.5.2 Performance Management Arrangements
The progress of Pathways to Work 2016-20 is 
assessed by 10 targets/metrics. All of these tar-
gets were met or exceeded by the end of 2016 
except for the exit rate, which was two percentage 
points off target.  
Changes in 2016 relate to the changing nature of 
the Pathways to Work (PtW) Strategy, from being 
focussed on helping people remain active and 
close to labour market participation during reces-
sion, toward focussing increasingly on reducing 
frictional unemployment, speeding up transitions 
to work and increasing activation for LTU and inac-
tive groups (Government of Republic of Ireland, 
2016).
3.5.3 Accountability
The 2016 Analytical Paper on Performance Man-
agement (European Commission, 2016) suggests 
that objectives are set by the government, in some 
cases in consultation with social partners. Follow-
ing that, targets are monitored at the national 
scale and not broken down to sub-national aggre-
gates. The Labour Market Council has a role in 
monitoring performance.
Progress on targets are monitored quarterly. Over-
all targets are to be achieved by 2020 but annual 
metrics in contribution to the overall achievement 
are also set. These targets assess the policy effec-
tiveness of PtW reforms that by their nature indi-
cate the direction of travel for changing policy 
emphasis as the labour market recovers. They are 
not intended as metrics for individual level perfor-
mance or as management tools – progress is influ-
enced by many factors, including macro-policy 
responses. Local management manage individual 
staff performance by the annual Performance 
Management and Development System (PMDS) in 
which goals and targets are set on an annual basis 
and progress is reviewed periodically throughout 
the PMDS annual cycle. While there is no perfor-
mance reward mechanism in situ, poor perfor-
mance can impact negatively on promotional 
opportunities.
Pathways to Work actions were developed in con-
sultation with key stakeholders; including consul-
tation events, requests for submissions and 
bilateral meetings The Labour Market Council, an 
independent advisory body that provides policy 
advice to the Minister and the Government on 
Pathways to Work includes members from Trade 
Union organisations, employers, academics and 
policy experts including the OECD and employer 
representative organisations. They provided advice 
and inputs to contribute to the drafting of the 
strategy and actions as well as the generation of 
targets as based on PtW actions. Quarterly updates 
of progress on PtW actions are published.8  
Pathways to Work 2015 commits to a rolling pro-
gramme of process and programme evaluations 
of PtW reforms. Two have been completed (Evalu-
ations of BTEA (2015), by the ESRI; and JobBridge 
(2016) by Indecon). Two are near completion 
(Qualitative evaluation of the BTEA Scheme; 
BTWEA [in-house]). The Evaluation of the Irish PES 
Process Reforms is due for completion in Q4 2017 
and two other evaluations (TBD) are likely to be 
initiated in Q4 2017/Q1 2018.
3.5.4 Successes and challenges regarding 
performance management
The Irish PES and the Department of Social Pro-
tection (DSP) participated in the Benchlearning 
assessment, which was conducted by external 
assessors in October 2015. Considerable time and 
resources were used in (i) the preparatory phase, 
i.e. completion by DSP of the self-assessment 
8  See www.labourmarketcouncil.ie, accessed 14 August 2017.
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questionnaire prior to the assessment, and (ii) dur-
ing the three-day visit/assessment. The sugges-
tions for improvement by the Benchlearning 
assessor team’s report were addressed by DSP in 
the Change Report which will form the basis for 
the follow up Benchlearning visit to DSP as part of 
the second cycle of the Benchlearning Initiative 
The Benchlearning assessment (European Network 
of PES, 2015) provided praise for the overall strat-
egy mapped out in Pathways, and the reform pro-
cess associated with the introduction of the Irish 
PES offices. However, the assessors also highlighted 
a range of areas for improvement, including:
 ● the need for operational guidelines and 
procedural targets for frontline staff;
 ● the need to focus more on ‘employment’ as an 
outcome for service-users as opposed to 
‘income’;
 ● a recommendation to organise indicators 
according to a framework of inputs, outputs 
and outcomes;
 ● stronger linkages between labour market needs 
and training programmes;
 ● the introduction and expansion of service-user 
and staff satisfaction surveys.
Overall, Ireland received a ‘developing’ assessment 
in relation to its Strategic Performance Manage-
ment. Specific recommendations addressed the 
areas of improvement above, and suggested intro-
ducing a clustering system to compare regions/
divisions/offices and a system of performance 
incentives.
3.5.5 Current Reform Plans
The PES is already responding to these recommen-
dations. The revised model is wholly focussed on 
employment outcomes. This focus is expanding to 
facilitate currently inactive working age adults 
(with a capacity to work) into employment, over 
the course to 2020. The Pathways to Work Strat-
egy is addressing the linkages between labour 
market needs and training programmes and from 
2015 DSP has conducted Customer Satisfaction 
Surveys of Jobseekers and from 2016 of JobPath 
clients, and the results are available on the DSP 
website9 (Department for Social Protection, 2016).
As the recovery takes hold, it is now appropriate to 
consider how activation approaches developed 
during a time of recession should be adapted for 
a time of recovery and to deliver social/active 
inclusion during a period of prosperity. Accordingly, 
in addition to focussing on people who are regis-
tered as unemployed, activation may (during 
a period of economic growth and recovery) seek to 
encourage other ‘non-active’ cohorts to participate 
in the labour market. Therefore, a two-pronged 
approach is proposed:
 ● Consolidation: consolidating the recent 
reforms to the Public Employment and 
Welfare Services and optimising provision to 
maximise outcomes for its clients. 
 ● Development: gradually expanding access to 
activation services, as resources allow, to 
other non-employed people of working age. 
The strategy contains 86 actions across 11 depart-
ments and agencies. There are 10 metrics against 
which progress is measured. Forty-two percent of 
these actions were completed by Q4 2016, with 
an additional 42% in progress and on target. As of 
Q2 2017, 62% of PtW actions have been 
completed.
3.6 Lithuania: Lithuanian PES 
(Lietuvos darbo birža)
3.6.1 Context
The financial crisis of 2008 created a difficult eco-
nomic environment for the Lithuanian PES (Lietu-
vos darbo birža/Lithuanian Labour Exchange, LLE). 
Prior to the crisis, Lithuania’s real GDP-growth rate 
was well above the EU average. During the crisis, 
it turned negative. Though fluctuating, economic 
growth has recovered since (3.5% in 2014 and 
2.3% in 2016). At the end of 2014, the unemploy-
ment rate was 10.7% (7.3% in May 2017), the 
youth unemployment rate was at 19.3% (12.5% 
in May 2017 (Eurostat, 2017)) and the long-term 
unemployment rate stood at 4.8% (3% in 2016).
The Lithuanian PES is an executive agency under 
the Ministry of Social Security and Labour. Despite 
being directly accountable to the Ministry, the Lith-
uanian PES is an administratively and financially 
autonomous public body managing its own assets. 
The Lithuanian PES provides labour market ser-
vices and bears the responsibility for implement-
ing ALMPs. The scope of services/responsibilities, 
among others, include registration of unemployed 
jobseekers, sourcing job vacancies, mediation of 
9  See http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Customer-Satisfaction-
Survey.aspx, accessed 14 August, 2017.
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suitable job opportunities, provision of professional 
counselling services both to jobseekers and 
employers and referral to education and training.
The Lithuanian PES is a three-level organisation 
consisting of the National PES office, 10 Regional 
PES offices, the Territorial Labour Exchanges (TLE) 
and 50 municipal Local PES offices. The work of 
the regional and local PES offices is coordinated 
and managed by the national PES office. The 
national PES office offers technical, administrative 
and financial support to the regional PES offices, 
and defines guidelines to frame the activity of the 
local PES offices. It is also responsible for moni-
toring and follow-up activities and controls the 
flow and the dissemination of information within 
the organisation. The regional PES offices, in turn, 
provide technical, administrative and financial sup-
port to the local PES offices.
The budget of the Lithuanian PES is set once a year 
by the Ministry of Social Security and Labour. The 
Lithuanian PES has the autonomy to decide on how 
to structure and spend its budget, based on the 
recommendations of the regional PES offices. The 
national PES office makes the final allocation of 
resources among the regional PES offices in line 
with the potential of the regional PES offices and 
labour market expectations.
3.6.2 Performance Management Arrangements
The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is 
responsible for setting annual labour market pol-
icy objectives in Lithuania. The objectives are pub-
lished in the Annual Action Plan. The Ministry 
allocates funds for the attainment of the annual 
and long-term goals and controls the use of the 
funds. The Lithuanian PES is responsible for the 
implementation of these objectives and for the 
management of allocated funds. 
The following objectives/targets are set for the 
Lithuanian PES for 2017:
1. improve the efficiency and capacity of  
the Lithuanian PES and its territorial units 
2. support integration of jobseekers into  
the labour market through matching 
3. increase employment opportunities for 
socially vulnerable groups
4. implement the Youth Guarantee initiative.  
The translation of objectives into targets, strate-
gies and processes mainly lies within the compe-
tence of the Lithuanian PES. Annual objectives 
are translated into key performance indicators at 
a national level by quantifying the level of targets. 
Joint meetings involving all directors of the Lithu-
anian PES decide how ambitious targets are to be 
set for the coming year.
The methodology of translating targets into per-
formance indicators is not defined yet; however, 
the translation is a strong bottom-up process, 
which takes into account the labour-market poten-
tial, as well as regional-level labour market fore-
casts for the following year. 
3.6.3 Accountability
Due to its institutional structure, accountability in 
the Lithuanian PES is bureaucratic, although it has 
autonomy in how to achieve the goals set by the 
Ministry and how to allocate its resources. Thus, 
the Lithuanian PES theoretically should have 
authority to decide how to achieve its objectives 
effectively and efficiently, conditional on having 
appropriate resources. Accountability is based on 
the clear distribution of roles and responsibilities. 
The Director General of the Lithuanian PES is 
responsible for reaching the target level of perfor-
mance indicators at the national level; the Direc-
tors of the Regional PES offices at the regional 
level, and the heads of the Local PES offices at the 
local level. Every staff member is assigned to indi-
vidual targets
All three administrative levels are involved in 
a systematic dialogue around performance. Results 
of performance monitoring are published on a 
quarterly and an annual basis. Regular publications 
are used to disseminate information about the 
added value of the Lithuanian PES on the website 
and national/local media. Benchmarking helps 
compare individual indicators, as well as determine 
and exchange best practices. The ‘Managers’ Win-
dow’ ‒ a well-developed and extensively used tool 
for the manager to monitor and control perfor-
mance ‒ is used at the Regional and Local PES 
offices to analyse how well targets are achieved. 
Corrective measures and the active exchange 
of good practices between the Regional PES 
offices are used in the case of divergence from 
the target. In addition, business meetings are 
organised at the regional and national levels to 
share good practices, analyse failures and examine 
potential improvements. As a result of such 
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meetings, suggestions for the next planning period 
are proposed to the Ministry of Social Security and 
Labour. 
Individual accountability is supported by a sophis-
ticated incentive system. Staff performance is 
assessed by the director once a year. Staff perfor-
mance is evaluated by translating performance 
into quantitative and qualitative results. The incen-
tive model for good performance has been in place 
since 2012.  Where the targets are met, PES staff 
at all levels are given both financial and non-finan-
cial rewards. Financial incentives include assign-
ment to one of three salary classes.10  Non-financial 
incentives include ‘Thank You’ letters from the Min-
ister and stars for good performance. 
All institutional levels of the Lithuanian PES involve 
social partners as advisors and also as participants 
in the implementation of labour market measures. 
At the highest level, the Tripartite Commission is 
set up from the representatives of trade unions, 
employers’ associations, and ministries and public 
bodies. Tripartite Commissions are also replicated 
at the regional and local level.
3.6.4 Successes and challenges regarding 
performance management
The Benchlearning external assessment (The Euro-
pean Network of PES, 2015) has identified a num-
ber of strengths that the Lithuanian PES possesses 
with regard to performance management. The 
main strength of the Lithuanian PES observed dur-
ing the assessment visit is that ‘the PES staff are 
clearly motivated and dedicated to making the fur-
ther development of the Lithuanian PES a success 
‒ everybody appears to be prepared to actively 
deal with the challenges ahead’. Despite resource 
challenges, the Lithuanian PES manages to effi-
ciently use those resources; partly enabled by 
a very well developed ICT-structure.
Besides proceeding with the current path of change 
and innovation, external assessors recommend the 
Lithuanian PES to ‘introduce a quality manage-
ment system (QMS) and to develop towards 
a more process-oriented management, to provide 
further staff development, to contract out some 
services, to move away from the frontline regis-
tration to the second stage’, and ‘to systematically 
use the results of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations’. 
10  There are 10-12 staff performance indicators.
Recommendations from the Benchlearning visit 
included suggestions around the ambition of tar-
get setting and the inclusion of all directors in this 
process. The recommendations also suggested 
that the methodology for setting targets was clar-
ified but the PES was praised for the adaptation 
of targets to local labour market conditions and 
their disaggregation to individual members of 
staff. The PES was also praised for the dissemina-
tion of performance information, and particularly 
the ‘managers window’, which enables local and 
regional managers to access performance data on 
an ongoing basis. Learning from practice and 
transfer of information between regions was also 
praised. The Benchlearning assessment also 
implied that the performance management model 
was appropriately linked to staff (financial and 
non-financial) incentives.
3.6.5 Current Reform Plans
The most recent initiatives (introducing a Quality 
Management System, switching to a more process-
oriented management, modernising human 
resource management, and the allocation of PES 
resources, etc.) were driven by PES initiatives 
based on self-assessment, PES to PES and mutual 
learning events and Benchlearning reports. Recom-
mendations provided by the external assessment 
were a roadmap to further actions. Thus, the Lith-
uanian PES has to constantly harmonise the exist-
ing system because political decisions sometimes 
do not correspond to the change agenda. Some 
changes, e.g. the improvement of the management 
and exchange of electronic documents, originated 
in government initiatives. The national employment 
support policy agenda and requirements set for 
public bodies to increase the effectiveness of pub-
lic services have also driven the initiatives.
The Change Report of the Benchlearning pro-
gramme (The European Network of PES, 2016) 
along with our interviews identified six recent ini-
tiatives in Lithuania that concerned performance 
management:
 ● Introducing a Quality Management System 
(QMS), which would be incorporated into the 
regular daily work of the Lithuanian PES. The 
reform is expected to optimally transform 
strategic objectives and targets into 
‘operational functions; clear, efficient client-
oriented processes; transparent PM’, which is 
to be achieved by improving a number of 
indicators; and engaging staff. The recurrence 
of operational functions and processes is 
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anticipated to be reduced and the satisfaction 
of both clients and staff members is to be 
increased, whereas the service is to become 
more effective. 
 ● Switching to a more process-oriented 
management with ‘mission, vision, objectives 
and key values redefined’, as a result of which 
the National PES office and 10 Regional PES 
offices would shift to a new Plan-Do-Check-
Act (PDCA) cycle-based management 
structure. The reform is expected to improve 
the performance management at the national 
and local levels, standardise the process and 
develop the organisation. It is anticipated to 
boost the level of personal responsibility at all 
levels and eliminate an overlap in 
responsibilities.
 ● Modernising human resource management by 
developing a new strategy, which would 
incorporate employee training and 
motivational systems, the new employee 
adaptive system, and introduction of expert 
resource teams. It aims at improving HR 
planning, training and motivation, identifying 
current and future HR needs, maintaining 
employee’s emotional stability and developing 
clear and transparent personnel career 
development plans. It is also expected to 
increase employee commitment and client-
oriented work while decreasing employee 
turnover. 
 ● Modernising allocation of PES resources by 
planning and distributing budgets based on 
PM system and corresponding indicators. It is 
expected to increase the effectiveness of PES 
budget planning and distribution.  
 ● Improving client segmentation by introducing 
a new service delivery model focused on 
optimising the provision of more client-
oriented services. It would result in the more 
effective use of HR, empower the PES to fully 
meet client’s needs, increase the 
responsibilities of specialists, enable an equal 
distribution of workload and the development 
of more effective performance monitoring.
Most of the participants of the team working on 
these reforms have been involved or have some 
knowledge of the Benchlearning process of the 
European Commission. Besides the PES staff, other 
stakeholders such as the Tripartite Commission 
were involved in designing the initiatives by par-
ticipating in meetings and discussions. The key 
constraints in developing the initiatives were time 
and human resources.11 
The Lithuanian PES expects that more process-ori-
ented, smarter and clearer management would 
support both the improvement of performance and 
accountability, which would be ideally proven by 
conducting independent effectiveness evaluation 
in the future. The PES has already started the eval-
uation of the initiatives by involving external qual-
ity management consultants and found promising 
results. Although the initial evaluation of the initi-
atives has not yet been finalised, the head of the 
Quality Management and Control Division is given 
the responsibility to evaluate the initiatives over 
time. Analysis of change and variation in perfor-
mance are going to be disseminated at training, 
seminars and round-table discussions involving all 
PES staff. These events are expected to commu-
nicate the mission, vision and values of the organ-
isation and increase internal communication 
capacities. The initiatives are expected to be imple-
mented in 2017-18.
3.7 Portugal: Portuguese PES 
(Instituto do Emprego e 
Formação Profissional)
3.7.1 Context
Portugal was hit hard by the global financial crisis 
of 2007 onwards, and suffered enormous job 
losses (OECD, 2017). The Portuguese PES, Instituto 
do Emprego e Formação Profissional (IEFP), has 
thus been operating in a very difficult economic 
environment. The unemployment rate reached its 
peak in 2013 at 16.4%, along with a long-term 
unemployment (LTU) rate of 9.3% and an extremely 
high youth unemployment rate of 38% (Eurostat). 
Real GDP started to grow only in 2014; the Portu-
guese economy has been growing at around a rate 
of 1.4-1.6% since then (European Commission, 
2017). In line with rebounding economic growth, 
the unemployment rate decreased to 11.2% by 
2016 (European Commission, 2017). The rate of 
LTU declined to 6.2%, youth unemployment rate 
stood at a still very high 28.2% in 2016 (Eurostat). 
The Portuguese PES is responsible for ALPMs and 
provision of labour market services to unemployed 
jobseekers and employers. It is somewhat special 
in that it is also a training agency and operates 
11  The Lithuanian PES has to comply with regulations 
pertaining to the employment of civil servants. This creates 
some limits on personnel resources such as a recruitment 
embargo on new staff.
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a large number of training centres. The Portuguese 
PES also has an active role in developing and sug-
gesting new measures to the Ministry of Labour. 
The Portuguese PES is a three-level organisation 
with a National PES office, 5 Regional PES offices 
and 54 Local PES offices. The national PES office 
coordinates and manages the work of the Regional 
and Local PES offices. The national PES offers 
technical, administrative and financial support to 
the regional PES offices and defines guidelines to 
frame the activity of the local PES offices. Further-
more, it is responsible for monitoring and follow-
up activities as well as the flow and the distribution 
of information within the organisation. The regional 
PES offices offer technical, administrative and 
financial support for the local PES offices. 30 of 
54 local offices are combined with a vocational 
training centre. Furthermore, the Portuguese PES 
runs a ‘vocational rehabilitation centre’ (National 
Institute of Rehabilitation, IP) to promote the 
labour market integration of people living with dis-
abilities or being at risk of social exclusion, and, 
nine business creation centres.
3.7.2 Performance management arrangements
The Ministry of Labour and the Tripartite Board of 
the Portuguese PES set labour policy objectives, 
which are aligned with the objectives of the Min-
istry of Labour, annually. According to the BL 
assessment, this process is based on labour mar-
ket analysis and it is clearly defined and well 
established. The objectives have a systematic 
structure and are published as part of the annual 
Plan of Activities that is approved by the Tripartite 
Board. As reported by the Portuguese PES, its main 
goals are to promote:12  
 ● The organisation of the labour market using 
both demand and supply-side measures to 
reduce disequilibria.
 ● The information, the orientation, the 
qualification and vocational rehabilitation of 
jobseekers with a view to placement and 
career development of workers.
 ● The school and vocational qualification of 
young people and adults through, respectively, 
the provision of dual certification training and 
certified vocational training, adjusted to 
individual courses and relevant to economic 
modernisation.
 ● The realisation, by itself or in collaboration 
with other entities, of vocational training 
actions appropriate to the needs of the people 
and of economic modernisation.
 ● The development of handicrafts and micro-
enterprises, as a source of job creation at a 
local level.
 ● The professional rehabilitation of disabled 
people, in conjunction with the National 
Institute of Rehabilitation (IP).
 
The translation of targets into performance indi-
cators and measurements is based on the yearly 
Plan of Activities that was mentioned above. Tar-
gets are translated into more than 20 key perfor-
mance indicators. The number and the target level 
of key performance indicators are revised every 
year (there were 25 key performance indicators in 
2015; 28 in 2016; and 27 in 2017). The indicators, 
for example, include process indicators as the 
number of persons covered by ALMP measures, 
and outcome indicators as the number of trainees 
who found a job. Target levels are defined in a top-
down and bottom-up process with initial input from 
the top and are set to all levels of the organisa-
tion, including individual performance indicators. 
The indicators are monitored regularly and the 
results are discussed at national meetings five 
times a year. 
3.7.3 Accountability
The Director General of the Portuguese PES is 
accountable to the Minister for Labour (State Sec-
retary for Employment). However, the Portuguese 
PES reported that it has a relatively wide degree 
of financial and operational independence. The 
autonomy of the Portuguese PES is underpinned 
by the existence of its Tripartite Administrative 
Board, which also has supervisory responsibility 
and operates under contract to the Ministry of 
Labour. It is felt that this helps to protect opera-
tional autonomy, while maintaining accountability 
(European Network of PES, 2015). On the other 
hand, operational autonomy is constrained by the 
administrative burden generated by a large num-
ber of ALMPs. The budget of the Portuguese PES 
is financed almost half-half by social security con-
tributions and the European Structural Funds (ESF).
Public accountability is supported by several 
reports that are published regularly on the website 
of the Portuguese PES about its quality assurance 
and performance management systems and 
results, yearly performance and future plans13, 
such as:
12  Source: https://www.iefp.pt/instituicao
13  All reports are available at  
https://www.iefp.pt/instrumentos-gestao
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 ● Evaluation and Accountability Framework 
(QUAR) (2011-2015, annual).
 ● Plan of Activities (2011-2016, annual).
 ● Activities Report (2011-2014, annual).
 ● Regular Budget (2011-2016, annual).
 ● Management Account (2011-2016, annual).
Within the institution, performance indicators are 
regularly monitored. Regular meetings are held 
between the Tripartite Board, the National PES 
office, and the regional directors to discuss perfor-
mance. Performance data is available to every 
level on a regular basis. Performance is subject to 
dialogues at the local level, but not in a less for-
mal manner. Deviations from targets are identified 
and discussed, although it is not clear exactly what 
mechanisms are in place to correct them. 
There are no financial and very few non-financial 
incentives. The Law 66-B/2007, of 28 December, 
established a sophisticated individual level perfor-
mance evaluation system, in which career progres-
sion was linked to reaching a certain level of yearly 
performance scores. However, since 2008, all pro-
motions have been restricted and career develop-
ment does not follow individual performance.  On 
aggregate, on the other hand, unsatisfactory total 
performance of the local, regional and national 
offices together may lead to budget cuts, and, it 
may also lead to the resignation of the Board of 
Directors. In case of insufficient performance, the 
Government is responsible for providing a plan of 
correcting actions (Article 26). The publication of 
annual PES performance is done in the form of an 
annual report. 
The Portuguese PES operates with a perception of 
its role as part of a network of stakeholders, social 
partners and authorities. All levels of the organi-
sation identified their relevant stakeholders and 
social partners, and established a working partner-
ship with them. Partnerships include the possibil-
ity to involve external expertise and to build 
networks at all levels to support the achievement 
of objectives and targets. Furthermore, the Bench-
learning Assessment highlights the approach of 
the Portuguese PES regarding its services for dis-
abled people. The Portuguese PES closely collabo-
rates with psychologists, nurses, rehabilitation 
centres, etc., in order to provide tailor-made ser-
vices to this group.
3.7.4 Successes and challenges regarding 
performance management
According to the Benchlearning assessment, the 
main strength of the Portuguese PES is the staff 
who are motivated and highly dedicated to mak-
ing the organisation a success. Another key 
strength of the Portuguese PES is the governance 
model with its Tripartite Board, which forms a 
strong basis for performance management and 
organisational development. The management 
system is found to provide adequate tools to fol-
low operational performance, although the BL 
Assessment pointed out that there was room for 
improvement. 
On the other hand, the Benchlearning assessment 
also expressed that the need for further improve-
ment of PM, and, in particular, of the quality man-
agement system had already been recognised by 
the Portuguese PES before the assessment. One 
particular problem is that front-line staff find the 
use of the monitoring tools demanding and this 
leads to inconsistencies in following-up perfor-
mance issues and data. For further enhancement 
of the performance of the Portuguese PES, the 
Benchlearning assessment suggested that it might 
have been helpful trying a technically less chal-
lenging management model. The assessment also 
pointed out the potential in the more systematic 
use of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation results when 
it comes to the planning and delivery of labour 
market services and the need to strengthen already 
well developed monitoring arrangements.
Although the management of partnerships, is 
undoubtedly a strength of the Portuguese PES, the 
assessment found room for improvement in 
expanding collaboration with temporary work 
agencies and private employment services. Fur-
thermore, the overall strategic approach in terms 
of goals, outcomes and results for the relevant 
partnerships as well as a transparent monitoring 
system should be developed in the future. Regard-
ing Human Resources, it is acknowledged that the 
Portuguese PES faces tight restrictions. However, 
the assessment suggested that since staff motiva-
tion a strong asset of the Portuguese PES, a more 
strategic approach should be pursued regarding 
the use of non-financial incentives and to distrib-
ute workload.
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3.7.5 Current Reform Plans
The effects of the financial crisis implied a series 
of significant challenges for the Portuguese PES in 
the improvement of its performance and reinte-
gration of unemployed persons in the labour mar-
ket.  This was especially true for those who, due to 
multiple disadvantage (age, unsuitability of skills, 
low qualifications), face a higher risk of structural 
unemployment. A further motivation for institu-
tional development lies in the fact that the Portu-
guese PES faces human resource constraints; the 
number of its employees has been set to the nec-
essary minimum and it does not have the auton-
omy to contract additional staff. Thus, optimising 
human resource allocation and efficiency through 
institutional development and the introduction of 
ICT resources has been essential.
In 2013, based on its own performance monitor-
ing, self-assessment, and also the Benchlearning 
assessment and recommendations, the Portu-
guese PES started a fundamental organisational 
change. This includes three recent initiatives that 
concerned performance management.
 ● Improving performance follow-up aims at 
providing performance information in a swifter 
and easier form to all management levels in 
order to rapidly detect potential problems and 
to enable them to take corrective action.  
It also aims at increasing availability and use 
of data on the labour market at all operating 
levels. It is expected to improve access to 
information on performance and to produce  
a survey of the instruments and procedures 
used in local PES offices to obtain knowledge 
on their surrounding environment. This will be 
used to identify and disseminate good 
practices. 
 ● Developing a system of non-financial 
incentives to promote individual performance 
at the local PES offices to build a culture of 
merit in the PES and increase staff 
satisfaction. 
 ● Establishing a programme that would boost 
caseworkers’ motivation, and also include 
individual training. It is aimed at increasing 
adjustment between the tasks and the job 
counsellors, restructuring work processes, 
redefining duties, and increasing personal 
motivation levels. A further expected outcome 
of this reform is an analysis and description of 
duties associated with skills and proficiency 
levels in local PES offices. In addition, it is 
expected to increase the level of adjustment 
between organisation’s needs and worker’s 
expectations. 
All three initiatives are still at an early stage of 
implementation; as of July 2017, the Portuguese 
PES has been developing the methodological 
details for implementation. The first stage of fol-
lowing-up performance will be implemented by the 
end of 2018, and  the other two initiatives do not 
yet have a deadline for implementation. 
Although the collaboration with stakeholders is 
a strength of the Portuguese PES, according to 
the Benchlearning assessment (European Network 
of PES, 2015), it is unclear how far stakeholders 
are involved in these reform initiatives. Due to budget 
constraints, all initiatives are being developed 
in-house, and no new initiatives are anticipated in 
the short term.
All three current reform initiatives are related to 
the A3 and A4 enablers, to follow-up, monitoring 
and evaluation, and the use of the results. The first 
initiative aims directly at improving follow-up, 
sharing performance indicators and promoting 
peer learning among units. The second and the 
third initiatives aim at improving incentives for 
good performance and improving performance by 
training and by updating the technology of front-
line service provision. 
The initiatives are fully in line with the suggestions 
of the Benchlearning assessment. In fact, the 
Benchlearning assessment directly suggested to 
‘professionalise the front-line staff through tailor-
made training’ and to improve the employer strat-
egy of the Portuguese PES.  Most participants of 
the teams working on these reforms were involved 
or were familiar with the Benchlearning process 
and the Portuguese PES reported that the Bench-
learning recommendations provided a useful sum-
mary of what needed to be developed in their 
Performance Management system.
These three initiatives are expected to increase 
performance and strengthen accountability 
through several channels. First, access to the 
same, transparent performance and labour mar-
ket measures and information about and on all 
levels of the organisation would improve service 
quality and directly increase accountability. Sec-
ond, improving the system of individual and insti-
tutional incentives would provide increased 
motivation for improvement. Third, training job 
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counsellors and better job counsellor-client alloca-
tion is expected to improve the quality and effi-
ciency of service provision. Fourth, staff training is 
also designed to increase accountability. 
The Portuguese PES is planning to assess change 
in performance due to these measures using its 
key performance indicator system, as well as sur-
veying employee motivation and efficiency. The 
Human Resources Department and the Planning, 
Management and Control Department will be 
responsible for the evaluation of the implemented 
initiatives. Information about the chance and vari-
ation in performance is going to be disseminated 
within the institution through training actions and 
regular working group meetings. 
Potential future initiatives are expected relate to 
the development of information systems (ICTs) and 
budgetary, financial and administrative manage-
ment, with a view to replacing existing and obso-
lete systems.
3.8 Sweden: Swedish PES 
(Arbetsförmedlingen)
3.8.1 Context
The Swedish economy was only moderately 
affected by the post-2008 crisis, with unemploy-
ment rising in 2008/9 to just under 9 % and then 
falling back relatively quickly from 2010 onwards. 
Unemployment stood at less than 7 % by 2016. 
Similarly, long-term unemployment (LTU) rose dur-
ing the crisis but is not far now from pre-2008 lev-
els. Nevertheless, youth unemployment – while 
lower now than in the past, at more than 17 % - 
remains relatively high in international compari-
sons (Eurostat, 2017). Growth has been strong in 
the last 2 years and is expected to remain so over 
the next 12 months (Government Office of Swe-
den, 2017). In this context, ensuring adequate sup-
ply of labour is a challenge. The integration of 
refugees is also a challenge for Swedish labour 
market policy, with Sweden hosting large numbers 
of refugees over recent years (Government Office 
of Sweden, 2017).
The Swedish PES, known as Arbetsförmedlingen 
(Af), is an agency of the government linked to the 
Ministry of Employment. The government – through 
the Ministry of Employment ‒ sets the budget and 
overall goals for labour market policy, including the 
PES. The Swedish PES is governed by a Board which 
is responsible for strategic management and does 
not include social partners (Manoudi, et al., 2014). 
The government appoints members of the board. 
The Swedish PES is organised into three regions, 
10 market areas (plus a National Service area) and 
280 local employment offices. The PES is respon-
sible for government funding for employment ser-
vices and unemployment benefits but these latter 
are actually paid by the private unemployment 
insurance funds. Recent years have seen increases 
in financial and staffing resources (European Net-
work of PES, 2016). Each year, the government 
sets out the objectives for the PES in a ‘regulatory 
letter’, and the PES Director-General must prepare 
a plan to deliver those activities, followed by an 
annual report showing what was done to achieve 
them (Af website, accessed 26 June 2017).
Since 2014, the PES has been undertaking 
a process of reform; referred to as a ‘Journey 
of Renewal’ and mapped out in its Strategic Map. 
The Journey of Renewal was predicated on evi-
dence that:
For years, Arbetsförmedlingen struggled with 
tackling challenges on the labour market. 
Micromanagement had been reoccurring and 
was inefficient, digital systems had not been 
developed and many of the working methods 
and organisational structures had not been 
revised and contemporarily adapted. Public 
confidence declined and Arbetsförmedlingen 
was finding it hard to perform its tasks. 
(Arbetsformedlingen, 2017).
This document puts forward a general management 
philosophy, which is about staff taking professional 
ownership of performance and continuous, self-
reflective improvement.  The Journey of Renewal 
has four sets of strategic areas for development:
 ● Develop offers and services ‒ Reviewing and 
clarifying services offered, including better 
targeting of services to specific needs.
 ● Develop digital services ‒ This includes both 
self-service and electronic access to services 
provided by staff. 
 ● Develop physical services ‒ Physical services 
need targeting and adapting to the more 
specific needs of particular groups of service 
users.
 ● Becoming a leading expert on labour market 
issues ‒ This includes systematic labour 
market monitoring and evaluation of services, 
linked to change planning.
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3.8.2 Performance Management
The overall goal of the PES is ‘to enrich Sweden by 
making people and companies grow’.  For 2017, 
the annual appropriation letter from the govern-
ment sets out six specific goals for the PES (Swed-
ish Ministry of Labour, 2016):
 ● improved matching to meet increased labour 
market demand and to increase employment 
transitions after accessing a labour market 
programme;
 ● the employment/study rate for new entrants 
to the labour market will increase, especially 
for women, after completion of a labour 
market programme;
 ● the proportion of LTU who enter work after 
accessing a labour market programme should 
increase;
 ● speed up access to work or study for young 
people leaving education, within the 90-day 
guarantee and specifically young people at 
risk of LTU;
 ● the proportion of disabled people who are in 
work or study should increase;
 ● the proportion of people without upper 
secondary education who are in regular study 
should increase.
The PES response to this in its Operational Plan sug-
gests that labour shortages have been a focus dur-
ing 2017. Annex 5 (Martinsson, 2016) reports on 
changes to PES performance management in the 
previous year. The appendix suggests that perfor-
mance management needs to relate to the under-
lying theory of change, which is summarised as:
 ● matching is achieved through correcting 
information problems between labour supply 
and demand;
 ● work to improve the skills and competencies 
of those with the most need can help expand 
the labour supply and increase the overall 
employment rate;
 ● payment of unemployment insurance needs to 
be effective to support job search activities 
and conditionality on job search is important 
for both legitimacy and to ensure effective 
transitions to work.
The full performance monitoring framework con-
sists of a range of 36 indicators specified to 
addressing the specific annual goals and other 
objectives. Performance is reported in an annual 
report (Arbetsförmedlingen, 2016b).  Many of the 
goals have multiple indicators associated with 
them. For example, the matching goal is supported 
by five separate indicators, which include a metric 
associated with the ‘Beveridge Curve’ (which fol-
lows the relationship between unemployment and 
job vacancies), employer survey questions about 
whether they are satisfied with the quality and 
quantity of referrals for job vacancies enabling 
them to recruit effectively and whether they feel 
PES services are adequate. There is also an indi-
cator of the share of jobseekers who move into 
work or study and a measure of whether jobseek-
ers move into work within 90 days after labour 
market training; indicators of transition to work/
study at different unemployment durations (within 
3 months, between 6 and 12 months, more than 
12 months). Other indicators focus on placement 
in training. There are indicators designed to meas-
ure the PES ‘market share’ in recruitment activity 
in the broader labour market and survey based 
indicators which assess the extent to which PES 
services helped jobseekers find work; satisfaction 
with the service and information provision. There 
are also analytical measures such as indicators of 
the net fiscal benefit (i.e. the business case) of PES 
services.
Performance indicators are reviewed each year in 
response to the Annual Appropriation Letter but 
also in relation to internal reflection, review and 
evaluation. For example, there was recent internal 
Swedish PES dialogue improving measurement 
and monitoring of the PES’s contribution to the 
‘public good’, customer satisfaction and the qual-
ity of services offered, which is thought to have 
been successful at improving the design of 
indicators.
Discussions with the PES stressed the way in which 
reforms have attempted to change the culture, 
attempting to encourage the organisation to be 
more reflective and based on taking ‘ownership’ of 
performance improvement. This culture shift is 
also associated with holistic analysis of perfor-
mance in the interests of the public good as well 
as to meeting specific targets on a short-term 
basis. An example is to promote high-quality 
matching as opposed to only rapid transitions to 
employment.
3.8.3 Accountability
Accountability is a strong feature of the Swedish 
PES performance management approach. It is 
maintained at multiple levels and through several 
processes. A specific approach to accountability – 
based on ownership of continuous improvement – 
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is becoming embedded in the organisation. The 
Annual Appropriation Letter, Operational Plan and 
Annual Report all form one formalised system of 
accountability. The Annual Appropriation Letter is 
established after discussions within the govern-
ment, which is shaped by political and public 
debates. It is also shaped by discussions between 
PES and the government. In addition to this, the 
PES Director-General and management board have 
regular ‘dialogues’ with government about the 
direction of the organisation and performance 
against the annual goals and associated perfor-
mance indicators.  
In addition to this, there are top-level performance 
‘dialogues’ between the Director-General and high 
level Departmental and Regional managers which 
occur two times a year, with the provision for an 
additional dialogue where circumstances demand 
it. There is also a monthly review of performance 
(‘The Situation Room’), which focusses on qualita-
tive progress to implement the four strategic goals 
(Arbetsförmedlingen, 2016a).  These dialogues 
then cascade down through the organisation, ena-
bling top-down and bottom-up dialogue. This is 
purposeful as the overall management philosophy 
sets the intention that staff at each level take own-
ership of their own performance in ways that 
respond to the specifics of their level, department 
or locality. It is therefore seen as inappropriate to 
provide a set structure for performance dialogues. 
Performance dialogues are preceded by quarterly 
follow-up reports. These are aggregated into an 
in-depth bi-annual report which assesses progress 
against indicators, goals and the overall reform 
process.
The HR system is linked in several ways to the per-
formance management approach.  At a top level, 
senior managers must draft a Personal Letter each 
year to explain how they have and will contribute 
toward the achievement of PES objectives. This is 
expected to be linked to the achievement of the 
strategic goals and will be informed – but is not 
limited to – the list of performance indicators. 
Annual salary agreements are linked to this pro-
cess. At lower levels of the organisation, the trade 
unions have negotiated a different process. In line 
with the ‘Journey of Renewal’, the annual perfor-
mance appraisal for staff has been revised. While 
in the past the system relied on meeting metric 
targets down to the level of individual Job Coun-
sellors, there is an explicit attempt to move away 
from this toward a system based on narrative dis-
cussion of how an individual contributes to the 
organisation’s objectives, which starts with the 
overall objective to ‘enrich Sweden by making peo-
ple and companies grow’. This is intended to shift 
the organisation away from a culture of meeting 
short-term metric targets while not contributing to 
this overall objective, thereby counteracting the 
types of negative incentives, which are often noted 
in relation to performance management.  It is also 
for these reasons of encouraging ownership, risk 
taking, reflection and shared learning that the HR 
system does not include explicit sanctions and 
incentives related to the achievement of perfor-
mance targets.
Social Partners and other stakeholders are not 
directly or formally involved in the indicator design, 
target setting and monitoring process but there 
are bi-monthly counselling sessions with repre-
sentatives from employers and trade unions where 
current topics are discussed. Public debates, includ-
ing contributions from employers and trade unions, 
and other commentators, shape the objectives that 
are set in the Annual Letter. A good example of this 
is the current priority placed on the education and 
integration of refugees in the Annual Appropria-
tion Letter, which reflects wider public debates 
about public policy priorities.
3.8.4 Successes and challenges regarding 
performance management
The Benchlearning assessment of the Swedish PES 
is generally very positive. There is positive com-
mentary on the way objectives are set and owner-
ship secured throughout the organisation. The 
commentary is also generally positive about the 
way that objectives are translated into perfor-
mance indicators, but suggests that the ‘Af perfor-
mance management model is challenging and 
does not fully align with the BL definition of excel-
lence in relation to the translation of targets into 
(key) performance indicators’.  While performance 
dialogues are praised, the assessment suggests 
that more could be done to make performance 
data more transparent externally.
The approach to performance dialogue and the 
managerial commitment to staff commitment and 
personal ownership is praised.  Generally, the 
assessors recommended the development of 
a quality management system to underpin the 
self-directed performance process. They recom-
mended that a demand side indicator be developed 
to better understand whether vacancies were filled 
with candidates referred by the PES.  The recom-
mendations also suggested developing non-pay 
incentives linked to performance management. 
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Overall, Sweden received a ‘well developed’ rating 
in relation to performance management, with most 
aspects being scored at the highest grade, and only 
‘Use of the results of Performance Management’ 
being scored at three.
Those involved in the Benchlearning process 
thought this a positive – if resource intensive – 
experience. The PES set up an internal benchlearn-
ing-working group to conduct the self-assessment, 
but also to disseminate successful methods from 
other countries which had been evaluated and 
summarised in the project. 
The working group consisted of experts from dif-
ferent levels and areas in the organisation as well 
as regional managers. The group evaluated differ-
ent ways of implementing proposed suggestions. 
The working group suggested a list of measures 
from this analysis, which were then formally 
approved by the Director-General. This work was 
then further evaluated and developed in the 
change report. The International Affairs depart-
ment was responsible for coordinating the change 
report, with the Director-General´s office. 
The recommendations strengthened the emphasis 
of some measures, which the Swedish PES is still 
working on. The detailed suggestions will serve as 
input to the further development of, for example, 
some indicators and measures of communication. 
The recommendations also challenged the Swed-
ish PES to consider alternative approaches as part 
of its ‘Journey of Renewal’. 
3.8.5 Current Reform Plans
The Af Change Report (Arbetsformedlingen, 2017) 
argues that many of the changes in the Benchle-
arning recommendations are already integrated in 
the Journey of Renewal:
 ● Quality Management – the Change Report 
argues that the Journey of Renewal involves 
“All co-workers at local and regional level …  
in creating a common understanding of  
the quality level”. Specifically, two ‘self-
assessment’ tools have been developed for 
‘operations’ and ‘support functions at head 
office’.  In addition, an evaluation of steering 
and controls has been undertaken.  As such, 
the recommendation is largely implemented.
 ● Demand side indicator – the PES report that 
they have developed an ‘average recruitment 
time’ indicator and an indicator which 
measures the PES share of recruitment/
vacancies in the labour market. They also 
report that they have an indicator of employer 
satisfaction with jobseekers referred to them.  
 ● Staff incentives – The PES has recently 
implemented an ‘online benefit portal’ and 
other HR developments which includes health 
and working environment, staff surveys, 
renewal of pay criteria and development 
opportunities. The PES consider this 
recommend as implemented. 
The annual processes described above provide an 
opportunity to review and revise priorities and their 
expression in performance management and 
accountability systems. New developments are 
also required on an annual basis to respond to the 
changing strategic goals, as set by the government.
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A3.1 Strengths, challenges and priorities (unprompted)
In these questions we ask unprompted questions about strengths, challenges and priorities to assess 
alignment with those expressed in the visit and change reports. 
1. What are the key strengths of your PES approach to performance management?
2. What are the current challenges your PES faces in performance management?
3. What are the current priorities for change?
4. What contextual factors are shaping this?
A3.2 Current Change processes / or stable PM system ‒ design
1. Please describe current change programme/system in relation to Performance Management.
Include here specific questions about the nature of the change – as per the change reports. Themes to 
pick up in prompts, etc.:
• Design of outcome/output/input indicators, etc.
• Level/scale at which measured.
• Frequency/timeliness of data.
Annex 3: Topic Guide
Introduction
The following questions are organised as a ‘semi-structured’ topic guide for interviews with PES and coun-
try respondents, national experts and assessors. The questions are designed to structure a discussion; it is 
not necessary to use all questions in all circumstances. Rather they can be used flexibly to ensure coverage 
of the main themes of interest.
Please ensure that you have read the relevant assessment and, where available, the change report, prior 
to undertaking the interviews. This can help to make the general questions more specific to the individual 
PES context.
Statement to read out
“Thank you for agreeing to speak to me.  We are undertaking a short research project for the European Com-
mission to explore PES and assessors experience with the Benchlearning process, including exploring why 
certain approaches have been adopted and their connections to change management.  We are interested in 
hearing about what you have learned from the experience, what has worked well and what can be improved. 
We would like to record the conversation if that is ok with you.  We will not provide that recording to anyone 
else and will try not to identity any individual respondent in our reporting.  Please specify if there is anything 
that you would like not to be reported, or there are areas where you would like us to be particularly careful 
about maintaining your anonymity.  
If you would like to change what you have said to us, or withdraw from the study at any point prior to our 
submitting our final report, then please email us.  Do you have any further questions about how we will store 
or use the data you provide to us or the purpose of the study?”
FOR PES/COUNTRY RESPONDENTS/NATIONAL EXPERTS
35
35
• Data management systems.
• How related to decision making.
• Targets, target setting processes and review, etc.
• Data management and IT.
• How linked to HR systems.
• Incentives and sanctions.
• Management processes – who manages, who is subject to management – and how etc.
• Who is involved in review/monitoring, etc.
2. Why have these changes been introduced? Or why was this system introduced?
3. Who is/was driving these changes (e.g. PES senior management, politicians, technical staff)?
4. What are you hoping to achieve with these changes/this system?
5. How do they relate to overall labour market goals?   
6. How are they expected to increase performance?
7. How are they expected to increase accountability?
8. To what extent have stakeholders been involved in designing these changes? And which stakeholders 
(e.g. politicians, social partners, advocacy groups, customers, etc.)?
9. To what extent did you draw on evidence from elsewhere to shape these changes?  
What evidence was influential?
A3.3 Current change processes – implementation
1. Who is implementing these changes?
2. What is the timetable for change?
3. Are you including stakeholders in the implementation process?  Who? How? Why?
4. How are you including and communicating with PES staff?
5. How do you expect different groups (e.g. staff, customers, employers) to act differently 
as a product of implementing this change?
6. How do you communicate these expectations?
A3.4 Current system/change process – evaluation and reflection
1. What evaluation activities are attached to these changes?
2. How will you know if these changes have been effective?
3. What processes are in place to review the continued effectiveness of this system/changes 
on an ongoing basis?
4. How will you assess change in performance over time?
5. How will you explain change in performance over time?
6. How will you assess variation in performance between different sub-national units 
(e.g.  offices, regions, individuals)?
7. How will you explain variation in performance between different sub-national units?
36
36
8. Who will be involved in these processes?  What resources are available for this?
9. How will you ensure that learning about change and variation in performance is disseminated?
10. Experience of Benchlearning process
11. Were you involved or have any knowledge of the Benchlearning process of the EC?
12. To what extent were your plans influenced by this, in terms of the preparation for the visit 
(e.g. self assessment), the visit of the assessors, the Year 1 report?
13. What resources were committed to the Benchlearning process?
14. Did the assessors challenge your plans and processes, including the change processes 
you have told us about?
15. To what extent did the external assessment report reflect your self-assessment?  
If it differed, how so and why?
16. Did you think that the external assessment and change reports provided a fair reflection 
of strengths and weaknesses in your PES, specifically in relation to performance management?
17. Did recommendations provided to you provide a useful summary of what needs to be done?  
18. How did you disseminate the assessment report and learning from the Benchlearning process?
19. Do all parties agree with the judgements and recommendations? Who/why, etc.?
20. What did you learn from this process?
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